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Symposium on 'Social History of Objectivity' (continued) *ABSTRACT Scientific objectivity is neither monolithic nor immutable: our current usage is compounded of several meanings -metaphysical, methodological and moraland each meaning has a distinct history, as well as a history of fusion within what now counts as a single concept of 'objectivity'. The rise of aperspectival history in nineteenth-century science is one strand of this plaited history of objectivity, as embodied in scientific ideals and practices. It is conceptually and historically distinct from the ontological aspect of objectivity that pursues the ultimate structure of reality, and from the mechanical aspect of objectivity that forbids interpretation in reporting and picturing scientific results. Whereas ontological objectivity is about the fit between theory and the world, and mechanical objectivity is about suppressing the universal human propensity to judge and aestheticize, aperspectival objectivity is about eliminating individual (or occasionally group) idiosyncracies. It emerged first in the moral and aesthetic philosophy of the late eighteenth century and spread to the natural sciences only in the mid-nineteenth century, as a result of a reorganization of scientific life that multiplied professional contacts at every level, from the international commission to the well-staffed laboratory. Our usage of the word 'objectivity' (French objectivite; German Objektivitdt) is hopelessly but revealingly confused. It refers at once to metaphysics, to methods, and to morals. We slide effortlessly from statements about the 'objective truth' of a scientific claim, to those about the 'objective procedures' that guarantee a finding, to those about the 'objective manner' that qualifies a researcher. Current usage allows us to apply the word as an approximate synonym for the empirical (or, more narrowly, the factual); for the scientific, in the sense of public, empirically reliable knowledge; for impartiality-untoSocial Studies of Science (SAGE, London, Newbury Park and New Delhi), Vol. 22 (1992) , Social Studies of Science self-effacement and the cold-blooded restraint of the emotions; for the rational, in the sense of compelling assent from all rational minds, be they lodged in human, Martian, or angelic bodies; and for the 'really real', that is to say, objects in themselves independent of all minds except, perhaps, that of God. In its thick layering of oddly matched meanings -it is not self evident, for example, what the repression of the emotions has to do with the ontological bedrockour concept of objectivity betrays signs of a complicated and contingent history, much as the layering of potsherds, marble ruins, and rusted cars would bespeak the same in an archeological site. This paper is meant as a modest contribution to that still nascent history. Insofar as objectivity has been a theme in recent science studies, it is questions of existence and legitimacy that have exercised discussants, rather than those of history. Neither the question of whether objectivity exists or not (and if it exists, which disciplines have it), nor that of whether it is a good or bad thing (the theme of some recent feminist literature),' will concern me here. All sides of these several debates have largely assumed that objectivity is and has been a monolithic and immutable concept, at least since the seventeenth century. So pervasive and apparently persuasive is this assumption that it is rarely even uttered. Those few works which mention objectivity and history in the same breath examine how various sciences -mechanics, optics, chemistry, biology -successively cross the threshold of objectivity at specific historical junctures, but the implication is that objectivity itself has no history.2 Among philosophers, those who have written analytically about objectivity recognize (or exemplify) the conceptual fault lines that sunder its various meanings, but all nevertheless treat it as a trans-historical given.3 Few of these recent studies, even those most directly concerned with objectivity in the sciences or with the historical context in which objectivity allegedly emerged once and for all, seriously entertain the hypothesis that objectivity might have an ongoing history intimately linked to the history of scientific practices-and ideals.
Objectivity and the Escape from
Insofar as objectivity has a history for these writers, be they oldfashioned progressivists or new-fangled feminists, it has a birthday (usually a Cartesian one, either 1637 or 1644), when it allegedly arrives on the scene full-grown and in full armour, like Athena from the head of Zeus.
In the face of such widespread conviction to the contrary, it would be natural to ask what grounds we have to believe that objectivity in the sciences does have a history. Yet it is still of importance to know when and how word and thing intersected, for the choice of which word to attach to which thing is never arbitrary. When, sometime around the turn of the nineteenth century, the word 'objectivity' absorbed the juristic meanings of impartiality along with the philosophical associations of external physical objects, it did not lose its more ancient ontological penumbra. It is this slow process of accretion and absorption that accounts for the layered structure of the notion of objectivity, and it is the historian's problem to explain when and how it became possible to lodge such originally disparate meanings and associations under the same linguistic roof. This is why the history of objectivity must shuttle back and forth between word and thing, attending to both. A history of the word without the thing risks degenerating into etymology; a history of the thing without the word risks anachronism.
A few eighteenth-and early nineteenth-century philosophical texts Now the sum of all that is merely OBJECTIVE we will henceforth call NATURE, confining the term to its passive and material sense, as comprising all the phenomena by which its existence is made known to us. On the other hand the sum of all that is SUBJECTIVE, we may comprehend in the name SELF or INTELLIGENCE. In the same manner, to the selfish and original passions of human nature, the loss or gain of a very small interest of our own, appears to be of vastly more importance, excites a much more passionate joy or sorrow, a much more ardent desire or aversion, than the greatest concern of another with whom we have no particular connexion. His interests, as long as they are surveyed from this station, can never be put into the balance of our own ... Before we can make any proper comparison of those opposite interests, we must change our position. We must view them, neither from our own place nor from his, neither with our own eyes nor with his, Why, for example, should public knowledge -observations most easily communicated to and replicated by as many people as possible -lay metaphysical claim to being the closest approximation of the real? These are knotty problems that would require a paper at least twice as long as this one; the best I can do here is to flag them as 
